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Abstract: This paper forms part of the feminist critique of the regulatory 
consequences of biomedicine’s systematic exclusion of the role of 
women’s bodies in the development of reprogenetic technologies. I 
suggest that strategic use of notions of the sacred to decontextualise 
and delimit disagreement fosters this marginalisation. Here 
conceptions of the sacred and sacralisation afford a means by which 
pragmatic consensus over regulation may be achieved, through the 
deployment of a bricolage of dense images associated with cultural 
loyalties to solidify support or exclude contradictory elements. Hence 
an explicit renegotiation of the symbolic order structuring salient 
debates is necessary to disrupt and enrich the entrenched and 
exclusionary dominant discourse over reprogenetic regulation. I draw 
upon previous analyses of strategic rhetoric associated with the 
regulation of infertility treatment and embryo research in the United 
Kingdom, the cultural anthropology of biomedicine and feminist 
ethnographies of reprogenetics to illustrate these claims. 





Notions of the sacred in health care analysis tend to be restricted to claims of the 
sanctity of life in continuing controversies over medical decision-making at the 
beginning and end of life [10, 69]. I suggest that a broader interpretative unpacking of 
rhetorical strategic use of conceptions of the sacred, along with processes involving 
the ascription of sacred qualities, may promote more inclusionary reprogenetic 
regulation. Legal and anthropological scholarship provide some support for this 
assertion. Close textual analysis of cases where claimants sought to recover for 
wrongful life or wrongful birth have noted judges’ rhetorical deployment of tropes of 
the sanctity of life as a means of denying recovery [36]. Similarly, dissection of the 
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in Pretty v United Kingdom 
(Application 2346/02) [2001] 2 FCR 97 reveals how the links between religious 
heritage and rights jurisprudence operated to preserve a vision of life as sacred which 
underpinned the Court’s decision that the right to life did not imply a right to die [87]. 
In addition, feminist anthropologists have traced the strategies whereby policy 
decisions over the regulation of human reproductive tissue were rendered acceptable 
through a reliance upon sacred iconography located in the shared symbolic order [18, 
19, 71]. My proposed model asserts that the strategic deployment of sacralised 
images which conform with shared cultural narratives permits the removal of salient 
decisions from their social context. Practices which challenge these rhetorical 
strategies are thus likely to be condemned in terms which reflect the underpinnings of 
such narratives. Connections between nature, culture, kinship, reprogenetics and the 
regulation of surrogacy will be explored in this light. 
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Consensus is unlikely on the ethical acceptability of reprogenetic research 
And techniques such as those involving human embryos. Indeed, public support for 
research at such moral boundaries may be always precarious and deeply ambivalent 
[49, 50]. At issue here is how incommensurate cultural values are to be involved in 
ethical discourse enabling negotiated regulatory compromises advantageous in a 
context of global competition [6, 70, 81]. Salter locates biopower today in ‘cultural 
biopolitics’ wherein states seek to control values which support or deter health 
technologies regulation, so that exchanges between states involved in the global 
knowledge economy are mirrored in a parallel moral economy where values are also 
traded [67]. My suggestion in this piece is that the cultural biopolitics of 
reprogenetic regulation involves a ‘purification’ [34], or decontextualisation of 
debate where the attempt to control values noted by Salter manifests in the 
exclusion or marginalisation of factors inconsistent with constructed sacralised 
narratives. Policy-makers deploy notions of the sacred to perform Latour’s ‘work of 
translation’ to enable impure, pragmatic alliances. In this sense, sacralisation may 
enable the ‘trade pidgin’ approach to managing knowledge which Strathern 
envisages as curtailing critique [75]. Yet I would suggest here that unpacking these 
mechanisms involving the sacred affords an opportunity to recontextualise and 
renegotiate the symbolic order through a recognition of how the sacred is drawn 
upon in various realms in ‘overlapping projects of world-making’ [77, 85]. As rich 
textual analyses of the public and parliamentary debates surrounding the passing of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 are plentiful, I have chosen to 
draw upon these secondary sources to illustrate how both the Act’s inception in the 
Warnock report [83] and its eventual passage demonstrate the workings of such 
political pragmatism [15, 44]. 
 
Reprogenetic Decision-Making in Context 
 
Policies governing the use of human reproductive tissue are embedded in ethical 
concerns over the appropriate limits to be placed upon the exploitation of 
 ‘‘biovalue’’, or the commercial exploitation of ‘‘life itself’’ [23, 20, 81]. In that 
human reproductive tissue is both involved in assisted reproduction and has value as 
a commodity, its regulatory boundaries are unique, permeable and contested. Values 
established within health care law such as altruistic donation are in tension with the 
commercial potential of human reproductive tissue, whether in the form of gametes 
or as stem cells providing patentable genetic material [27, 38, 37, 55, 60, 61, 84]. 
Policies are decided within a context of nation states competing to provide 
hospitable regulatory structures in order to attract biotechnological investment, 
international agreements on trade and the contested regulation of biomedicine [61, 
67, 70]. 
 
Decisions over how human reproductive tissue should be treated are unlikely to 
be consensual as disparate points of view are grounded in incommensurate moral 
universes. Oppositions are currently framed around conceptions of reproductive 
autonomy, the sanctity of life and human dignity. Those favouring free choice here 
would use autonomy to justify reducing regulation to the ensuring of safety after 
risk/benefit calculations [63, 32]. Disparate groups who oppose this regulatory 
stance within biomedicine seek to demarcate the permissable through reliance on 
concepts such as dignity, market-inalienability and human flourishing. Brownsword 
distinguishes between these attitudes to regulation, describing them respectively as 
the ‘‘ruling synthesis’’ and the ‘‘dignitarian alliance’’ [3, 4]. Certainly, the 
government response to the House of Commons Committee on Science and 
Technology’s report on regulating the use of human reproductive tissue may be 
characterised as embodying this ruling synthesis [31]. 
 
Cultural anthropologists tend to focus on ethnographic studies of the impact of 
reprogenetics in order to stress the value of local knowledge for policy decisionmaking, 
compared to abstract disembodied universalised discourse [13, 22, 19, 17, 
56, 57, 68, 73, 74, 89]. Strathern comments, ‘‘there is something about the market 
analogy that is less than benign. It tends to collapse all other analogies into itself, the 
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effect being rather like that of money itself which, in differentiating everything, 
makes itself the only source of difference’’ [1992b, pp. 35–36; cited in Sharp 68, 
p. 303]. Reducing ethical discussions to calculations of risk, benefit and profit may 
be seen as a purification in some sense equivalent to this. 
 
Social scientists writing in this area agree. Sharp considers that ‘‘[o]nce issues of 
property ownership and autonomy take centre stage, they displace competing 
cultural constructions of the body, other possible reactions to the dilemmas of 
biotechnologies, and, finally, the shaping of alternative ethical responses’’ [68, 
p. 299]. Thus the use of metaphors and narratives charges commodities with 
symbolic sociopolitical significance. Images drawn from the human body, read as 
nature, order our understanding of the world [11]. Sharp draws upon the work of 
Richardson on ‘semantic massage’ to illuminate how persuasive images like the 
‘gift of life’ are used to marginalise discord over the commodification of the body 
[62]. She asserts that ‘‘policy makers work cooperatively and aggressively to 
perpetuate language that foregrounds gift exchange even as they consider the further 
commodification of the body through a host of marketing strategies’’ [68, p. 315]. 
 
My argument in this article is that a central rhetorical device in this discourse of 
decision making over human reproductive tissue is the strategic deployment of 
notions of the sacred. In order to minimise public discord over contentious conflicts 
between, say, health care ethics and the politics of biovalue, policy makers and 
those who seek to influence them deploy semantic massage foregrounding 
sacralised icons and mechanisms. This is evident in the association between human 
reproductive tissue and genetics, which has impacted on decision-making processes 
not merely in terms of profit and the pragmatics of politics, but also as a signifier of 
new figurations of kinship, together with new views of health and moral 
responsibilities in relation to reproduction as mediated by risk [33, 52, 56, 57, 
66]. I will now consider in greater depth the promise offered by feminist and 
anthropological explorations of the negotiation of meaning within these discourses. 
 
Framing the Debate: Nature, Procreation and the Sacred 
 
Discursive universes have collided over the proper place of the new reproductive 
technologies in Britain since the 1970s when the ‘biomedical industrial reproduction 
complex’ [65, p. 175] recognised their commercial potential. Simultaneously, those 
who had begun to define themselves as infertile sought treatment in increasing 
numbers, while National Health Service health care resources shrank. Decisions 
over human reproductive tissue have acted as a nexus for the sacralisation of the 
gene [28], for nature ‘‘enterprised up’’ [73, 74] and for a ‘‘trafficking in nature and in 
life itself’’ [22, 20, 21, 15]. My aim in this section is to use conceptual tools taken 
from the anthropology of technoscience to suggest that present regulatory 
difficulties stem in part from a failure to renegotiate or reinvent the distinctions 
between the biological and the social, or the person and the thing, or between nature 
and culture, in explicit contextual terms. 
 
Pottage, considering the relations between law and biopolitics, draws attention to 
Bernard Edelman’s characterisation of Anglo-Saxon law concerning individuality 
and the body as ‘‘cynical pragmatism’’ [59, p. 153]. It is the intention of this piece to 
contribute to the project of re-negotiation of meaning and regulation by developing 
the thesis that the rhetorical strategies involved in sacralisation circumvent explicit 
regulatory consideration of issues seen as overly controversial [36]. Parallel 
sacralised discourses which centre upon genes, reproduction, kinship and salvation 
converge upon reprogenetic regulation, rendering it particularly vulnerable to 
cultural overdetermination. This narrows public debate to specific icons designated 
as the focus of intense meaning, such as embryos, pre-embryos and, later, stem 
cells. Ethical subtleties are elided as contextual factors become marginalised, or 
rendered invisible, preventing nuanced societal negotiations. Sites of such cultural 
location of intense meaning are particularly prone to semantic massage by policymakers 
anxious to marginalise controversy [51, 46, 47, 87]. I shall first place this 
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process in context, then sketch out some consequences of converging sacralising 
discourses. 
 
The anthropology of the reprogenetic regulation begins with the observation that 
legislation here typically lacks a legitimate foundation for decision-making and 
debate [17]. This designates a crisis in the current Euro-American symbolic order as 
kinship givens fragment [1]. Anthropologists view cultural norms within human 
representations of the world as traditionally legitimated by reference to that which is 
constituted as natural or sacred, and, as such, removed from, and superior to, the 
petty doings of humanity [11]. These referents, of course, change with the times. In 
societies which become more secular, the sacred does not disappear but fragments 
and reattaches to cultural elements which are dense with meaning. As religion is a 
subset of the sacred rather than its equivalent, a dynamic symbiosis between 
sacralisation and secularisation may be found in all cultures. Demerath explains this 
as follows [9]. 
 
Since any culturally impregnated activity has potentially sacred functions, we 
need to consider secularisation as a process that may affect a much larger 
inventory of any society’s cultural stock, including its political, economic, 
scientific and familistic values and practices. By the same token, the 
countervailing process of sacralisation may also involve these non-religious 
spheres … Any probing analysis of the sacred or its secular tendencies and 
consequences must occur within a broader context. This is increasingly the 
case in increasingly complex and differentiated societies. (2000, p. 4) 
 
Varieties of the sacred experience are demonstrable in reprogenetic decisionmaking. 
Integrative experiences such as healing encourage the ascription of godlike 
qualities to the healers, such as those who enable the infertile to bear children. 
Sacred quests motivate those committed to political causes and ideological battles, 
such as uncompromising proselytisers of ruling synthesis or dignitarian alliance 
viewpoints. When the sacred is interpreted as centred upon a Durkheimian 
collectivity, it is important to recall that, that which is civil may become sacred, as 
in national constitutions, human rights and ideas of community. Much of cultural 
anthropology has had as its focus the demonstration of the sacred resonance of 
family and kinship networks. Disagreements over decisions on the uses of human 
reproductive tissue are hence likely to include significant clashes of competing 
conceptions of the sacred, as in oppositions between sacralised autonomous choice 
and assertions of the sanctity of life in debates over whether, say, embryos should be 
created in order to be destroyed in the research process. Thus groups, concepts and 
processes involved in reprogenetic decision making may be viewed as structured by 
the sacred, sacralisation and desacralisation. 
 
What, then, is the relationship between nature and the sacred as this applies to 
kinship and reproduction? Those studying the history of Euro-American thought 
have traced the movement of the sacred in Darwinian theory from God to Nature 
[88]. Yet as nature is increasingly subjected to human enterprise, ‘nature enterprised 
up’, it becomes perceived as endangered, vulnerable and unable to provide the 
baseline by which human actions may be justified. As a consequence, the new 
reproductive technologies and their potential fracturing of previously naturalised 
kinship relations give rise to peculiar difficulties in relation to their legal regulation 
[74]. In terms of the frame which I suggest would prove useful to analyse 
reprogenetic regulation, the sacred fragments: transcendence is still assigned to 
specific cultural icons, but without previous coherences in the shared symbolic 
order. 
 
The promise of this approach for the project of public involvement in the 
renegotiation and renewal of the symbolic order rendered necessary by the new 
reproductive technologies is clearly demonstrable. An example here is Carol 
Delaney’s characterisation of paternity as a cultural construct [8]: 
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[P]aternity is a concept, the meaning of which is derived from its interrelations 
with other concepts and beliefs … a conceptual relation [not] a categorical 
entity, the presence or absence of which can be determined empirically. (1986, 
p. 495) 
 
Such a perspective would clearly assist courts and policy makers charged with 
assigning legal parenthood where this does not correlate in a simple fashion with 
intended genetic inheritance, such as in cases involving surrogacy, arguments 
between those whose gametes have created embryos over their future and mistakes 
in fertilisation during IVF treatment. Desacralised, genetic ties may be framed as an 
optional element of familial ties. Similarly, a perception of kinship networks as 
modulated by choices of family form and membership would permit a flexibility 
many would support [39]. Indeed, the recent recognition of same-sex marriages, the 
registration of civil union partnerships and the ability of single adults and same-sex 
partners to access reproductive services as well as to adopt can be seen in this light. 
Thus the destabilisation of how we make sense of our selves, our kin, our world and 
our future ushered in by the new reproductive technologies offers us a chance to reimagine 
collective life and laws in a way which enlarges our shared symbolic order. 
 
Sacralisation as a Representative Strategy 
 
Sacred figurations are those where we locate our assumptions of truth and our hopes 
for transcendence. Donna Haraway has traced how, through what she terms 
‘salvationary narratives’, ideas of evolution and progress have been melded with 
traditional Christian stories of salvation to support science’s position as provider of 
universalised truth. In Haraway’s view, 
 
[t]he overwhelming power of the images that promise fulfilment (or 
damnation) on earth infuses secular histories of progress and apocalypse. 
Secular salvation history depends on the power of images and the temporality 
of ultimate threats and promises to contain the heteroglossia and flux of 
events. … The discourses of genetics and information sciences are especially 
replete with instances of barely secularized Christian figural realism at work. 
(1997, p. 11) 
 
I have suggested above that nature ‘enterprised up’ loses the capacity to act as a 
site for the sacred. Culturally reframed as biology, it gives rise instead to figurations 
of the gene and of ‘life itself’ [16]. ‘Life itself’ enables a sanitisation and 
decontextualisation of technoscientific practices as it ‘‘depends on the erasure of the 
apparatuses of production and articulatory relationships that make up all objects of 
attention, including genes, as well as on denial of fears and desires in technoscience. 
[28, p. 10] 
 
Hence our hopes for transcendence locate themselves not only in narratives of 
science as creator, but, more specifically, in the biomaterials of the new reprogenetic 
technologies. DNA has been sacralised as ‘‘not just a biological structure, but as a 
cultural icon, a symbol and even a magical force. … a self explanatory icon of 
genetic determinism’’ [80, p. 164]. Analysis of contemporary genetic folklore 
reveals that the DNA-print is also perceived as providing certainties as the ultimate 
identifier, ‘‘the essence of identity and the source of social difference’’ [53, p. 198]. 
Seductive images such as that of DNA as the language of the sacred text of the Book 
of Life promise ‘‘the possibility of a final solution to the uncertainties of living … 
because they interlock scientific, cultural and theological narratives’’ [80, p. 152]. 
The gene has become that magical object, a fetish [14]. 
 
What this frame of inquiry establishes is how far a location of intense cultural 
meaning on an object or a concept may initiate a process of sacralisation, and how, 
once this sacrum has been established, it becomes decontextualised. This leaves it 
peculiarly resistant to rational inquiry or assessment. Yet detailed conceptual 
unpacking may enable this. A recontextualisation may take place, enabling a more 
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complex renegotiation of the salient issues. In order to illustrate this process, I wish 
now to turn to the processes whereby the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990 came into being, considered from the perspective of the analytic framework 
established above. My purpose here is to demonstrate how sacralisation may be used 
to sideline issues which are perceived as too politically inflammatory, here, 
surrogacy, to reach pragmatic regulatory compromises. The feminist concerns 
explored demonstrate that this decontextualised, universalist view of the situation is 
misleading. Yet policy makers’ strategic deployment of sacralisation favours it as 
enabling a pragmatic compromise. 
 
Salvation Stories, Sacrums and Surrogacy 
 
Sacralised foetal figurations assisted the conception of the regulatory structure 
governing the new reproductive technologies. Given the centrality of kinship to the 
Euro-American symbolic order, debate over desirable legal structures ordering 
family life might be expected to appeal to the ‘natural’ as a legitimising device. 
However, the destabilising of this baseline by the fracturing of the components of 
the ‘facts of life’ rendered the strategic recourse to sacralisation more central to 
policy makers’ search for a pragmatic compromise over regulation. 
 
The current regulatory structure originated with the birth of Louise Brown, the 
first ‘test tube baby’ in 1978. The Warnock Committee was set up in 1982 to advise 
legislators, government and the general public on human fertilisation and 
embryology. The Warnock report, published in 1984, was followed in 1986 by a 
consultation paper seeking public views. A White Paper containing proposed 
legislation published in 1987 went before Parliament in 1989, and was enacted after 
impassioned debates and amendments in 1990. Commercial surrogacy had been 
banned in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1986 after a moral panic following 
media hysteria over Kim Cotton’s commissioned pregnancy. The rhetoric in the 
public and parliamentary debates which ushered through the approval of in-vitro 
fertilisation defined the world of achieved conception in the language of the renewal 
of hope and miracle babies, with IVF considered as ‘‘giving nature a helping hand’’ 
[19, p. 200]. Eyewitness testimonies were referred to as ‘conversion experiences’ 
[19, p. 202]. Women’s bodies, whether those of nurses or would-be mothers, were 
figured as suffering devotional icons, the mater dolorosa whose faith would lead to 
the joy of a holy child [19, p. 206]. Imagery of the foetus took on Christ-like 
significance, acting as a sacrum, or focal point for transcendent emotions. This 
rhetorical strategy built upon already established figurations of the foetus as 
sacrificial sacrum from the abortion debates in the United States and Germany [12, 
24]. Scientists in white coats figured both technological progress and the male 
Creator, completing the cast of the Holy Family salvation story. Sarah Franklin 
explains that, 
 
[t]hrough IVF, science and nature are unified in an act of pro-creation. This is 
a critical interface. Symbolically, this union and its ‘fruit’ not only signify, but 
actualise, the potency of natural science in the service of the natural family. 
Where there was no family, technology has enabled one, through an act of 
miraculous creation, at once the product of nature and science. (Franklin, 
1997, p. 207) 
 
My argument here is that this narratised confluence of the Holy Family and 
sacralised science enabled certain previously unconceivable practices to enter public 
debate in search of legitimation while simultaneously excluding the rhetorically 
inconsistent. Those which could be brought within the salvation story, IVF and 
embryo research, flourished, whereas surrogacy, which could not, became 
discursively invisible in ways which matter. Strategic semantic massage was 
crucial in this process. 
 
Scientists viewed embryos resulting from in-vitro encounters of sperm and egg 
which were not used in IVF as desirable research material. This aim was not only 
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semiotically incompatible with the Holy Family symbology, but was also in direct 
conflict with Enoch Powell’s Unborn Child’s (Protection) Bill, which set out to ban 
all human embryo research on the grounds that the embryo is a full human being, 
and had been approved by a substantial majority in its second reading in February 
1985. Pat Spallone has traced the history whereby the term pre-embryo, strategically 
(and successfully) invented for the subsequent debate, came to be perceived as 
related to no-one. She associates this process with the previous establishment of the 
foetus as ‘‘an emblem, an image of life itself and the true person, thus leaving out 
the life, body and person of the pregnant woman’’ (1996, p. 209). The parliamentary 
debates on embryo research maintained this separation in that the mother figured 
most frequently as the embryo’s ‘source of nutrition’ or its ‘environment’ [15, 48, 
71, p. 219]. Franklin describes the embryo as ‘‘a kind of liminal kinship entity … 
betwixt and between humanity and otherness’’, arguing that the contestations over 
embryo research ‘provide a template of cultural definitions of what it is to be a 
person and of what makes a kinship tie: they are late twentieth century debates over 
the meanings of naturalness and humanness’’ (1995b, pp. 336–337). 
 
The fact that an embryo can develop into a human being fully only inside a 
woman’s body, and can be created outside a woman’s body only through surgical 
and hormonal intervention in a woman’s body was discursively marginalised [18]. 
Hilary Rose points out that as the infertile moved from being ‘‘something of a pariah 
group, associated with messy and undignified procedures’’, to becoming ‘‘the 
potential recipients of glamorous, highly scientised medicine’’, there was a silencing 
about certain aspects of the price to be paid (1994, p. 180). The most obvious of 
these is the pain, inconvenience and uncertain risks suffered by the women 
undergoing infertility treatment. Rose emphasises the way in which the Warnock 
report and the subsequent legislative debate sidelined any discussion over the 
appropriate degree of professional control over treatment and refused to consider the 
political economy of infertility, despite the health care resource allocation 
preoccupations of the time. 
 
Nowhere was there going to be an attempt to try to estimate the incidence of 
the problem, to establish, however tentatively, how many people were 
childless or childfree, or to consider the most appropriate models of services. 
What was offered was an ‘ethical’ debate around treatment that assumed and 
constructed a universal longing for children, and assumed and constructed a 
universal provision of infertility treatment without even the most rudimentary 
financial calculations. (1994, p. 182) 
 
My contention here is that considering these discursively excluded elements 
together will enhance understandings of the difficulties surrounding the reprogenetic 
regulation. The figuration of men in white coats experimenting on human 
reproductive material was likely to fuel fears of scientists playing God with human 
life, especially given the associations of embryos with foetuses and abortion [45]. 
These fears were successfully culturally allayed, by and large, via the placement of 
the scientist as Father/Creator helping nature to achieve the Holy Family. Such a 
location, along with the sacralisation of the embryo and the constructed identity of 
the pre-embryo, encouraged the imagery of women as containers (mothers as 
bearing rather than creating children). It was infertile women’s purportedly 
universal longing for a child rather than actual child bearing which was 
foregrounded as justifying the new reproductive technologies. 
 
Material inconsistent with this sacralised salvationary narrative, like surrogacy, 
was condemned as unnatural. One of the reasons why surrogacy does not fit 
comfortably into salvation stories of heroic intervention to help nature along is that 
IVF is very likely to involve the treatment of fertile women. Those who undergo 
IVF in order to ensure that their infertile male partners have access to children to 
whom they are genetically related, along with those who seek donor insemination in 
order to have a child without a male partner, may at least be subsumed under the 
category of women yearning for a child and so naturalised. Surrogates, however, are 
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fertile women whose impregnation, whether or not by IVF, and intention of parting 
with the child they bear together disrupt the symbology which eased the new 
reproductive technologies into cultural and legal acceptance. Whether they offer 
gestational services for altruistic or economic reasons, they are failing to conform to 
the woman as yearning receptacle model. By doing so they raise the otherwise 
invisibilised and uncomfortable issues of assisted conception as a business, and of 
gendered exploitation as a practice based on the figuring of woman as enforcedly 
altruistic. Surrogacy problematises female autonomy, provokes paternalistic controls 
over would-be surrogates’ choices and juxtaposes a claim to infertility 
treatment with a provision of services many regard as exploitative. 
 
Yet who is being exploited, by what means and by whom, if at all, remain 
contentious. The demonisation of commercial surrogacy which accompanied the 
passing of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 helped to ensure that rational 
public debate over the incidence of infertility, the commercial interests of the 
biomedical industrial reproduction complex, the health care resource allocation 
implications of infertility treatment and the gendered altruism required of women 
undergoing infertility treatment, donating gametes and providing gestational 
services in the interests of the privileged passing on their genetic heritage failed 
to take place. The continuation of this stance in subsequent official reports 
demonstrates how strategic deployment of sacralisation prevents the recontextualisation 
and renegotiation of these issues which is essential if public participation in 
decision making over human reproductive tissue is to take place in any realistic 
sense [2, 30, 31, 39]. Yet feminist explorations of reprogenetics provide valuable 
examples of how this recontextualisation and renegotiation might take place. 
 
Feminists Recontextualisations and Renegotiations 
 
I have argued above that a strategic deployment of sacralisation has resulted in a 
decontextualisation of issues around human reproductive tissue, such as the 
incidence of infertility, the commercial interests of the biomedical industrial 
reproduction complex, the health care resource allocation implications of infertility 
treatment and the gendered altruism required of women undergoing infertility 
treatment, donating gametes and providing gestational services in the interests of the 
privileged passing on their genetic heritage. As a consequence, public involvement 
in a renegotiation of the symbolic order has been compromised. Yet the shift in 
feminist views of women’s relationship with the new reproductive technologies 
from one of gendered exploitation to a more nuanced appreciation of women’s 
agency in engaging in choices and the creation of meanings demonstrates how this 
might take place. 
 
Many feminists contemplating new reproductive technologies originally opposed 
them as irrevocably embedded in technopatriarchy and so hostile to women’s 
interests [5, 25]. More recently, others have considered that these technologies may 
have a place within feminists’ support for women’s reproductive self-determination, 
taking a contextual approach to problems of infertility and childlessness which 
hesitates to label those women involved in the new reproductive technologies as 
exploited or as suffering from false consciousness [19]. Feminist ethnographic 
research here provides a more modulated representation, pointing to women’s 
ability to produce connections which destabilise reductionist versions of kinship 
[26] and overturn the marginalisation of women as foetal containers [89]. Indeed, 
the sacralisation of women as nurturers may serve to provide those who support and 
oppose abortion with common ground which moves beyond the polarities of choice/ 
right to life politics [24]. This reframing of the issues can be seen in terms of a move 
from the initially relatively simplistic conception of woman as an oppressed sacrum 
to a portrayal of women exercising choice and renegotiating cultural understandings 
[54]. The current regulation of surrogacy may provide a comparable example. I 
would argue that this, as exemplified in the Brazier and Warnock reports, is based 
upon a sacralised picture of women as victims, vulnerable to exploitation and 
commodification. Imposing a universalised gendered altruism on parties to 
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surrogacy arrangements decontextualises surrogacy from the fact that assisted 
reproduction operates within a commercial context. Failing to draw upon the 
experiences of the women involved in providing surrogacy services or to address 
their concerns like the enforceability of surrogacy agreements results in regulation 
which protects in theory rather than in practice [39]. In addition, renegotiations of 
reprogenetic regulation and cultural symbology based upon women’s experiences 
are compromised. The apprehension of complexity and agency brought into being 
by feminist research into other areas of assisted reproduction as sketched out above 
is lacking. Thus, feminist ethnographies which focus upon the understandings of 
those involved and how these lead to the creation of new meanings demonstrate the 
operation of a recontextualisation and renegotiation of the issues surrounding 




In my view, attempts to analyse debates over decision making in relation to human 
reproductive tissue which oppose the ‘ruling synthesis’ rhetoric of autonomy, choice 
and rights to that of the ‘dignitarian alliance’ championing of relationality, altruism 
and responsibilities are using a conceptual framework which has reached an 
impasse, while alternative discursive representations involved in the dichotomising 
of commodification and market-inalienability provide too impoverished a set of 
descriptors to remedy this. The anthropology of technoscience view of the present 
difficulties surrounding reprogenetic decision-making instead promotes as necessary 
public renegotiation over the distinctions between the biological and the social, the 
person and the thing and the means of cultural legitimation in explicit contextual 
terms. 
 
I have drawn upon conceptions of the sacred as deployed in the debates 
surrounding the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 to 
illustrate the framework suggested in this piece. While space precludes my doing so 
here in relation to subsequent reprogenetic regulation, such as that over stem cell 
research, I should like to sketch out some possibilities for future inquiry. Feminist 
analyses of stem cell regulation evidence comparable exclusionary rhetorical 
strategies and semantic massage. For example, the risks associated with egg 
donation, the high failure rates of IVF and the problematics of designating healthy 
embryos as ‘spare’, along with the views of the women subjects of reprogenetic 
technologies, are elided from salvationary narratives wherein technoscientists offer 
redemption to groups constructed as suffering [56]. Yet the need to gain not only 
public approval but also to guarantee reliable sources of stem cells through donated 
embryos has created significant contextual differences. Feminists note that 
strategically hyped promises of stem cell technologies promote feelings of 
obligation amongst those who could donate embryos [56, 57, 86]. Here the rhetoric 
of the sacred gift of life aligns itself with the recent focus on the anthropology of 
hope [43, 42, 76]. Consideration of the relationship between anthropology and 
theology suggests that the analytic frame provided by the sacred may afford 
additional understandings. Robbins draws upon Milbank’s claim that secular reason 
is based upon an ontology of power and conflict [40] to assert that anthropology 
should ‘‘take on the challenge to find real otherness at the fundamental level of 
social ontology’’ in order to show the world how to find hope for real change 
without God [64, p. 292]. Feminist ethnographies explored above elucidating 
altruistic motivations of those working within reprogenetics or donating reproductive 
tissue delineate ontologies of interdependent interconnectedness mirroring 
communitarian underpinnings of healthcare regulation as influenced by the legacy 
of Titmuss [2, 78, 79]. Gifts of human tissue may be read here as rhetorically 
induced exploitation, or as more complex choices to sustain mutuality in a noninnocent 
view of life itself as sacred. The potential of the sacred to contribute to the 
renegotiation and recontextualisation of the symbolic order within overlapping 
projects of world-making may be seen here. 
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Without this perspective, in the absence of shared ethical values, political 
pragmatism ensures that the default position is regulatory oversight of a range of 
‘safe’ choices based upon expert assessments of risk and benefit. This regulatory 
strategy fails to promote public negotiation, despite the rhetoric of participation, as 
agency is reduced to autonomy and resistance to risk. For example, recent changes 
in policies, such as that removing anonymity from gamete donors, within the 
regulation of assisted reproduction have been criticised by clinicians, ethicists and 
the public for a disregard of the experiences and views of those involved [7, 29, 60]. 
Yet there is an undoubted consensus among commentators that provided such 
dialogue takes place within a context where issues are appropriately framed, fruitful 
explorations of the ambiguities of extant expert and local knowledge and responses 
can take place [35, 41, 58, 72, 82]. It is in this spirit that this article proposes an 
unpacking of rhetorical strategies which have deployed sacralisation in such a way 
as to reverse acontextualisation, in order to promote the necessary renegotiation of 
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